

# Normative and Empirical Justice Research: A Preliminary Exploration of Public Administrators in the Health Care Context

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*Social equity and social justice have been a fundamental concern for public administration scholars and practitioners. So far the literature is largely normative in nature and centered on John Rawls' theory of justice, paying less attention to how public administrators actually think about justice. This article reviews the background of justice theories and debates, compares three empirical justice beliefs, and explores public health administrators' principles of justice. Drawing from an online survey of a convenience sample, the authors find both merit-based and equality-based beliefs among public administrators in the health care context. The results show that respondents' justice beliefs affect their attitudes toward government spending on health care, and the respondents' justice beliefs are not affected by their factual knowledge about inequalities.*

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**S**ocial equity, the fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly and by contract (NAPA 2005), has become the “third pillar for public administration” (Frederickson 1990, 229) and “one of the major normative touchstones for administrative ethics” (Cooper 2004, 397). In this context, social equity is primarily approached from the perspective of social justice, especially distributive justice.<sup>1</sup> This focus on distributive justice has been dominant in the public administration literature since the New Public Administration (e.g., Frederickson 1997, 1990, 1977; Harmon 1974; Hart 1974;

JPAE 2004), and it has gained new momentum in recent years due to the growing inequalities in the American society. Frederickson (2005) writes, “in the past thirty years social equity has grown in importance in public administration at the same time that in virtually all aspects of social, economic and political life, Americans have become less equal” (4). Reports by the Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy of the American Political Science Association (APSA 2004) and the Standing Panel on Social Equity in Governance of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA 2005) have documented the increasing inequalities among American citizens and their threats to equal citizenship and representative democracy.

As a response, some scholars call for more rigorous and proactive social equity scholarship (APSA 2004; Oldfield, Candler and Johnson 2006), and others argue the public administration community should “walk the social equity walk” by helping to implement the concept of social equity in practice and developing workable quantitative tools, indicators, and benchmarks (Frederickson 2005; NAPA 2005; Rutledge 2002). Proposals are made to include social equity in the teaching of the Masters of Public Administration (MPA) programs (JPAE 2004) and in the practice of performance measurement (Glaser and Denhardt 2000; Yang and Holzer 2006). Most scholars seem to agree that social justice has to be practiced or exercised in public administrators’ daily work. So far, however, it remains unclear whether and how these normative proposals can come true. Particularly, the proposals seem to have an implicit assumption that we know exactly what social justice is and we can specify “the” principle of justice for public administrators.

The assumption of “the” principle of justice overlooks the fact that people, legitimately, have different conceptions of justice and good life. John Rawls’ theory of justice, which lies at the core of the public administration scholarship on social equity, is widely acclaimed and promoted. However, it is not without its critics (e.g., Nozick 1974; Sandel 1982). Survey and experimental evidence shows that ordinary people hold competing principles of distributive justice – when to use which principle depends on factors such as individual characteristics and the context and good of the distribution (Elster 1995; Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995; Miller 1999; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, and Bornstein 2001). As Rosenbloom (2005) points out, “it is difficult to tell students they should do something ill-defined, especially when... there are apt to be multiple competing ideas about what constitutes social equity in even simple distributional matters” (248).

The existence of multiple beliefs in justice does not mean we should accept them as desirable or preferable, nor does it deny the normative appeal of Rawls’s theory. However, it does have implications in the implementation of justice regarding feasibility and legitimacy because the preferences of citizens, including their preferred justice norms, determine the judgment of political legitimacy in a democratic society (Miller 1999; Swift 2003). For public administrators, they are restricted from arbitrarily defining justice in their daily work. “Public administrators may be free to advocate values such as social equity, but they need democratic-constitutional legitimization to impose those values on the political system”(Rosenbloom 2005, 250). On the other hand, public administrators, as agents of the government, often have great discretion in their decision-making. For example, welfare administrators often determine “client worthiness” and allocate services accordingly (May-

nard-Moody and Musheno 2000; Schneider and Ingram 1997). Therefore, it is important to examine public administrators' justice beliefs because they shape what public administrators do, which has significant implications for democratic governance and citizen welfare. This line of inquiry is essential even if one upholds a specific justice principle because to implement that principle, if it is at all possible, s/he needs to understand public administrators' actual beliefs.

This study aims to raise more questions about the normative versus empirical orientation in justice studies, extending the empirical justice literature from psychology (e.g., Deutsch 1985), sociology (e.g., Alves and Rossi 1978) and political science (e.g., Scott et al. 2001) to public administration. After a brief review of the background on social justice theories and debates, this article introduces and compares three principles of distributive justice. Following that, it tries to preliminarily apply the empirical justice literature to public administrators in the health care context, with hypotheses exploring four questions: (1) Is justice a multi-dimensional concept for public administrators? (2) How do public administrators' justice beliefs relate to their personal characteristics and political ideology? (3) How do the beliefs affect administrators' attitudes toward increasing health care budgeting? And (4) will exposure to inequality facts change administrators' justice beliefs? The hypotheses were then tested with a convenience sample with the intention to stimulate more rigorous empirical studies in the future.

### Theory of Justice

Much of the public administration perspective on social equity has been built on John Rawls' theory of justice (e.g., Frederickson 1997, 1990, 1977; Harmon 1974; Hart 1974). Frederickson sounded the call for equity and helped establish its definition for public administration in the 1970s. He emphasizes that administrators should be concerned with the distribution of goods and services to particular categories of persons such as disadvantaged minorities. In Frederickson's view, Rawlsian theory is "compatible with the social equity perspective on public administration" (1990, 230), and Rawls "presents the most consistent ... claim for an ethic of intergenerational fairness" (1994, 431). Similarly, Hart suggests that a theory of social equity must be based on a carefully explicated ethical paradigm. He argues for Rawls' theory because it is "the most significant alternative theory available to us" (1974, 4). As Cooper concludes, the New Public Administration is preoccupied "with one particular philosophical ethic—Rawlsian social equity" (1994, 9).

In *Justice as Fairness*, originated as lectures at Harvard in the 1980s, Rawls aims to clarify certain issues raised in *A Theory of Justice*. In Rawls' view, principles of justice are not specified by an outside authority, such as God, nor do they derive from rational intuition or from natural law. Instead, they are settled by an agreement reached by free and equal citizens engaged in cooperation. *Theory of Justice* develops two principles of justice, which are restated in *Justice as Fairness* as follows:

1. Each person has the same inalienable claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (2001, 42).

As Sandel (1982) states, Rawls provoked three great debates. The first debate was between the utilitarian theories (Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill)<sup>2</sup> and the deontological perspectives (Kant and Rawls). The difference principle, also known as the maximin rule,<sup>3</sup> is crucial to challenging the utilitarian view that dominates the Western culture (see also Dombrowski 2001). The second was between Libertarian liberals, who argue government should respect not only basic civil and political liberties but also the rights to enjoy the fruits of the market, and egalitarian liberals like Rawls, who argue civil and political liberties cannot be exercised without addressing basic social and economic needs. The third debate was between Sandel and Rawls regarding the relationship between the good and the right,<sup>4</sup> and whether government should be neutral among competing conceptions of the good life.

Espousing Rawls' theory means to take sides in the debates. Yet, as Rawls (1985) makes clear, "in a constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines" (223). His own theory is not without critics. Rawls states that the central question of justice is how we select fair terms of cooperation that all participants can accept. Furthermore, Rawls points out that how we define justice is the focus of the present conflict between liberal and conservative views over the legitimacy of social welfare policies (2001), of the liberal critique of aristocracy, and of the socialist critique of liberal constitutional democracy (1985). Therefore, are we ready to take sides and impose Rawls' theory to public administrators as "the" theory of justice? Doing so may contradict a core component of Rawls' theory—the neutrality thesis, that the state should keep neutral in competing concepts of good life. While many contemporary exponents of liberalism have given up on neutrality,<sup>5</sup> others hold to the thesis, considering it part of the distinctiveness and appeal of liberalism (Jones 1989).

Rawls has been attacked from both the conservative right and the liberal left. From the right, Nozick (1974) rejects Rawls' difference principle, arguing that "Rawls has not shown that the more favored man A has no grounds for complaint at being required to have less in order that another B might have more than he otherwise would" (197). Nozick proposes an entitlement theory of justice, arguing that a distribution is just if it arises from a prior just distribution by legitimate means. As a result, there is no pattern to which a just distribution must conform, and "we have no obligation to help those worse off than we are" (Singer 1975, 4). Nozick argues against any government that would use its power to achieve distributive justice.

From the Left, one criticism has to do with impartiality.<sup>6</sup> Young (1990) suggests that the reasoning of the original position is monological, pointing out that the "veil of ignorance removes any differentiating characteristics among individuals, and thus ensures that all will reason from identical assumptions and the same universal point of view" (101). Young argues that Rawls has not been successful in demonstrating that his original position prevents reducing the plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity, even though Rawls criticizes util-

itarianism on the grounds that it does not recognize the plurality of moral subjects. Young (1990) observes that “moral reason that seeks impartiality tries to reduce the plurality of moral subjects and situations to a unity by demanding that moral judgment be detached, dispassionate, and universal” (102). Impartiality or neutrality, again, is not entirely consistent with the New Public Administration’s argument that public administrators should use their own value judgments. More importantly, public administrators are citizens living their different personal lives while implementing public policy. It is unreasonable to expect them to have same assumptions, attitudes, and beliefs of justice.<sup>7</sup>

Rawlsian theory is not supported in many experimental studies that were carried out following the Rawlsian assumptions. For example, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) created a situation of “veil of ignorance” and asked participants to determine rules for distributing income they were to earn. They found that the Rawlsian solution was almost never chosen by participating groups (1 percent). Rather, the most popular solution was maximizing income after setting a minimum income (78 percent). Mitchell and his colleagues (1993), also using experimental study, found supportive evidence for Rawls as participants believed that unequal income is not in itself merited, but their other results contrasted with Rawls as merit clearly affected participants’ beliefs.

### **Individual Beliefs in Justice**

Although Rawls, particularly in his later work, believes that principles of justice must be publicly justifiable, which indicates a role for empirical evidence about the beliefs of ordinary people, his reliance on a form of contractarian reasoning in the veil of ignorance pulled him away from examining the empirical evidence (Miller 1999). The lack of interest in how ordinary people think is also true for many other social philosophers such as Nozick (1974). However, some recent philosophers have emphasized the role of empirical beliefs in theorizing about justice, attempting to understand and explain the norms of justice that people adhere to under different situations or spheres (Miller 1999; Swift 2003; Walzer 1983). Efforts are called for and made to fill the gap between normative and empirical approaches of justice (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992; Mitchell et al. 1993; Scott et al. 2001). Deutsch (1975) first proposed a threefold classification that differentiates equity, equality, and need as possible values to be used as the basis of distributive justice. Miller (1992) made a good case for reclassifying “equity” as “desert” or merit. Based on Miller (1999) and Kluegel and Masaru (1995), we compare three major allocation principles: equality, need, and desert (merit).

**Equality.** While consensus is lacking in regard to the meaning of equality (Rae 1981), its focus has generally shifted from equality of rights to equality of conditions in modern justice theories (Dahl 1989), with the latter remaining the presumptive principle in many modern theories of justice (Weale 1985). Therefore, Scott et al. (2001) define equality as absolute equality of outcome. Miller (1999) argues that equality relates to the value of citizenship that any full member of a just society should enjoy the same set of rights and obligations. Empirical evidence shows that people do prefer the equality principle in certain distributional situations. Lerner (1974) finds that subjects in cooperative tasks are more likely to choose a greater degree of equality than in other settings (Lerner 1974). Deutsch (1985) finds that people in cooperative settings are more likely to shift from the merit prin-

ciple to the equality principle, and groups permitted to make decisions for themselves are more likely to choose the equality principle. Mikula (1975) concludes that stable (as opposed to temporary) groups tend to favor equality because group members expect they will interact repeatedly in the future. In general, as Deutsch (1975) contends, equality is likely to be favored in relationships in which “the fostering or maintenance of enjoyable social relations is the common goal” (143).

**Need.** While the equality principle requires that every member of the society gets an equal share of what is being distributed, the principle of need specifies that distribution should be based on an individual’s needs rather than anything else. Needs are understood in terms of the general ethos of the community, which implicitly or explicitly determines the standards an adequate human life must meet. The principle of need often leads to decisions to provide a “social minimum” to disadvantaged individuals, as reflected in social welfare programs in the United States (Marmor, Mashaw and Harvey 1990). Deutsch (1975) contends that the need principle would be favored in relationships in which “the fostering or maintenance of personal development and personal welfare is the common goal” (143). Miller (1999) asserts that the need principle is most suitable for solidaristic communities, where people have developed mutual understanding and trust, sharing “a common identity as members of a relatively stable group with a common ethos” (26). Such solidaristic communities are more likely to be found in families, clubs, religious groups, work teams, and professional associations. Greater level of solidarity and trust is required to underpin the need principle than the equality principle.

**Desert.** The principle of desert, or merit, is based on the notion that there should be a constant ratio between an individual’s contributions and his or her returns. It suggests that people should get what they deserve, not what they need or what others get. Since contribution is usually unequal, this principle often becomes a justification for inequality. While Rawls (1971) attacks the desert principle as unjust, others argue that it is a legitimate distribution norm (Sandel 1982; Sher 1987), which is supported by empirical evidence that people do consider merit in making distribution decisions (Miller 1992). The desert principle is more likely to be favored in what Miller (1999) calls instrumental associations, where people relate to one another in a utilitarian manner. In other words, “each person comes to the association as a free agent with a set of skills and talents that he deploys to advance its goals. Justice is done when he receives back by way of reward an equivalent to the contribution he makes” (28). After a review of survey responses in different nations, Miller (1999) finds that there is a favorable attitude toward the desert principle worldwide. For example, in an American study, 78 percent of respondents agreed that “under a fair economic system, people with more ability would earn higher salaries” and 85 percent affirmed that giving everybody about the same income regardless of the type of work they do would destroy the desire to work hard and do a better job (Kluegel and Smith 1986; McClosky and Zaller 1984). Experimental studies confirm that the desert principle is often preferred by participants (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992).

In comparing the three principles, Miller (1999) writes,

If competitive or instrumental relationships encourage the use of desert cri-

teria of distribution and highly cooperative or solidaristic relationships provoke the use of need criteria, equality may be appropriate to groups that display enough solidarity to make their members forgo claims based on differential contribution, but not so much that they are willing to go beyond mechanical equality to take account of individual circumstances (73).

### **Hypotheses in the Health Care Context**

This article attempts to provide an empirical description of how public health administrators think of justice in the health care context and whether they hold conflicting beliefs about justice. We aim to examine whether the three norms of justice can be observed among public administrators. Although the three norms are distinguishable in theory and in experimental studies, the distinction between the equality principle and the need principle is not absolute (Scott et. al 2001). Miller (1992) acknowledges the difficulty in separating the two in practice: “Where people have warm relations with one another and feel a sense of solidarity with their group, it is likely that they will also feel committed to advancing one another’s welfare. Thus the two goals will often go hand in hand” (570). Therefore, we hypothesize that in general there are different norms in existence, without specifying the number of norms we expect to observe.

H1: The concept of justice in health care has different dimensions.

In addition to describing the dimensional structure of the concept of justice, we attempt to examine how personal characteristics, such as gender, race, education, and political party affiliation, relate to perceptions about different justice norms, treating them as control variables in the quantitative model. More importantly, we are interested in how individuals’ factual knowledge about inequalities affects their stance toward different justice norms. One may hope that if we expose public administrators or MPA students to the expanding inequalities in today’s society, they will then change their beliefs about justice. Such possibility does exist as people at times may change their stances after being exposed to facts that challenge their original values. However, it is more common to observe that people with strong values interpret the challenging facts in a way that would rationalize and reinforce their original values (Weick 1995). Recent policy evaluation literature has emphasized that values always affect how facts are constructed and evaluated (Fischer 1995). Furthermore, the advocacy coalition theory shows it is difficult to change policy actors’ core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), and justice is such a core belief. Beliefs of justice are deeply rooted in an individual’s values and worldviews (Miller 1992; Kluegel and Masaru 1995), which are extremely difficult to change until s/he experiences dramatic, even traumatic, events in her or his lives. When individuals are shown facts of inequalities, the justice norms they uphold will affect how they make sense of the facts: why do the inequalities occur, are they desirable, should we do anything about it, and if so, how? Therefore, we hypothesize:

H2: Factual knowledge about inequalities in the health care provision is unlikely to be associated with individuals’ beliefs of justice.

Beliefs of justice affect individuals' decision making, behavior, and other cognitions that are related to distribution (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995; Miller 1999). Bobocel and her colleagues (1998) find that, independent of individuals' level of prejudice, justice beliefs affect their attitudes toward social policies such as affirmative action. Kluegel and Masaru (1995) find that individuals holding the equality principle are more supportive of welfare state policy than those who hold the merit principle (see also Miller 1999). We are interested in whether government should expand its health care spending in order to assist more uninsured or disadvantaged individuals or groups, an issue that is similar to Kluegel and Masaru's (1995) question about welfare state policy. When desert-based justice is at work, it is very likely that disadvantaged people will be perceived as "undeserving," market-based solutions will be embraced, and health care spending increase by government be opposed. On the contrary, when equality- or need-based justice dominates the consideration, the increase of health care spending by government is likely to be supported. Therefore,

H3: Different norms of justice are associated differently with individuals' attitudes toward the idea of increasing government funding for health care. More specifically, desert-based justice is negatively associated with the idea, while equality-based justice and need-based justice are positively associated with the idea.

Since we hypothesize that knowledge about inequalities is unlikely to change individuals' justice norms, we further hypothesize that the knowledge is unlikely to be associated with individuals' attitudes toward increasing government spending on health care. Whether one thinks government should increase health care spending to help the disadvantaged depends on his or her views about the appropriate function of government and whether the disadvantaged deserve the spending. The two judgments are related, and both are deep core beliefs difficult to change.

H4: Factual knowledge about inequalities in the health care provision is unlikely to be associated with individuals' attitudes toward the idea of increasing government funding for health care.

### **A Preliminary Test**

To test the hypotheses in a preliminary way, this article uses data obtained from a web-based survey conducted from September through November in 2003. The survey was done by inviting participants, largely via email, to answer a questionnaire posted on the Zoomerang.com web site. Internet self-administered surveys have great benefits in terms of cost, speed, and media richness (Simsek and Veiga 2001). They also ensure anonymity and, in turn, reduce social desirability bias, achieve higher levels of self-disclosure, and increase willingness to answer sensitive questions (Joinson 2001; Tourangeau 2004).<sup>8</sup>

**A Convenience Sample.** A broad range of individuals were defined as study population, namely public administrators who might affect the health care budget process. We obtained email addresses from several sources: a New Jersey public sector directory, the American Society for Public Administration's 2003 national conference participants' directory, various ASPA email lists, websites of federal and state agencies in New Jersey, and

health care related associations. Including members of professional associations and administrators from a single state may constrain the external validity of the results. However, the convenience sample is accessible and includes a wide range of people who care about the budgets for health care and whose views will, in the long run, affect how health care dollars are budgeted. Rather than concentrating on a specific type of public administrators, it includes administrators, directors, managers, supervisors, planners, evaluators, and local health officials from a variety of government agencies<sup>9</sup> and public and nonprofit organizations that address human and health needs.

A fair amount of the emails we sent were returned because the email addresses were no longer in use. Assuming all other emails went through, we had about 2300 valid email addresses. We sent three rounds of reminder emails to increase response rate, and we received 626 responses in total. After dropping those who identify themselves as either “not working” or “working for private companies, private physician’s office, churches or faith-based organizations,”<sup>10</sup> we had 509 responses from people who were working in governments at all levels, nonprofits, or quasi-governments. The sample size is large enough for our analysis.<sup>11</sup> Given that online surveys usually have low response rates (Simsek and Veiga 2001), our response rate (about 27 percent) was decent<sup>12</sup> and sample representation was not a major threat to the extent that we seek survey information to gain initial insights into the topic. Nevertheless, the limitation of the sample does require caution in generalizing the results. Table 1 summarizes the information about the respondents.<sup>13</sup>

**Measurement.** We first conducted seven interviews with individuals familiar with health care and the budgeting process in New Jersey. Interviewees included a professor of health administration at a private university in New Jersey; a New Jersey State Senator who has served for many years on the Budget Committee and also has served as its chairman; a

**Table 1. Respondent Characteristics**

<b>Organization</b>	22% local government; 33% state government; 9% federal government; 36% nonprofit or quasi-government
<b>Education</b>	5% high school or associate; 13% bachelor, and 82% graduate
<b>Position</b>	47% administrative or managerial; 26% education; 7% budgeting and finance; 20% others
<b>Gender</b>	49% males; 51% female.
<b>Race</b>	80% white; 11% African-American; 2% Asian; 7% others
<b>Age</b>	12% between 25-34; 15% between 35-44; 34% between 45-54; 30% between 55-64; 3% 65 and over
<b>Income</b>	2% below \$25,000; 9% between \$25,000 and \$49,999; 15% between \$50,000 and \$74,999; 20% between \$75,000 and \$99,999; 21% over \$100,000
<b>Political Party</b>	57% Democrats; 20% Republicans; 17% Independents
<b>Political Philosophy</b>	52% moderate; 32% Liberal; 14% conservative

**Table 2. Exploratory Factor Analysis Results**

Variables	3-Factor solution			2-Factor solution	
	F1	F2	F3	F1	F2
Need_Based_1	79*	-9	5	79*	-9
Need_Based_2	65*	-35	-7	62*	-34
Need_Based_3	68*	-29	3	68*	-29
Need_Based_4	65*	-34	33	69*	-35
Equality_Based_1	65*	-25	29	60*	26
Equality_Based_2	70*	-21	-8	66*	-21
Equality_Based_3	75*	-25	28	79*	-25
Equality_Based_4	62*	-30	17	64*	-30
Desert_Based_1	-36	43*	-9	-37	43*
Desert_Based_2	-22	76*	8	-21	73*
Desert_Based_3	-16	52*	-21	-20	52*
Desert_Based_4	-17	65*	-5	-16	67*

Note: 1. Results here are based on ULS, instead of ML, estimation. However, results based on ML are similar to the results here.

2. For details about the variables, see Appendix 1.

3. \*: loadings  $>.40$ .

top administrator with the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; a mid-level manager in the N.J. Department of Health and Senior Services; a hospital's senior vice president; and two physicians. We then developed a survey based on the interview and priori studies (Daniels 1985; Miller 1999; Kruegel and Smith 1986). The instrument was thoroughly field tested through three test surveys, which were administered through the Zoomerang.com web site. Each test included approximately 50 responses. The tests took place in September, October, and November, 2004. Items used in our final model are summarized in Appendix 1.

The measures for the latent variables were found to be internally consistent and reliable. Since the measurement of the three justice norms is related to Hypothesis 1, we will discuss it in the results section. Knowledge about health care inequalities was measured by an index with three items ( $\alpha = .66$ ), asking whether respondents were aware of the inequality in health care access between African Americans and whites regarding three aspects. Attitudes toward increasing government funding for health care were measured with an index of three items on a 4-point Likert type scale ( $\alpha = .77$ ), asking whether the states or federal government should increase funding to assist hospitals and the poor and uninsured.

**Procedures and Results.** A major purpose of this article is to extend the empirical justice literature to public administration and show perceptions of social justice have distinctive dimensions. Given the exploratory nature of this study, we used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to examine the factor structure of the data. Since the justice survey items were measured with 4-point Likert type scales, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation may not generate reliable results. We instead used ULS (unweighted least squares) estimation.<sup>14</sup> The results supported a 2-factor solution, not a 3-factor solution. Factor loadings for both solutions are reported in Table 2. For the 2-factor solution, factor 1 actually included items for both equality-based justice and need-based justice. As a result, we decided not to make a distinction between the equality principle and the need principle, and subsequently labeled factor 1 as equality-based justice. We created index scores (the sum averaged by the number of items) for the two factors retained. In general, Hypothesis 1 regarding the existence of different justice dimensions or norms is supported.

Table 3 summarizes descriptive statistics and correlations among all variables. Although age and income were measured at the ordinal level, we treated them as interval variables because the number of categories was over seven, the category intervals remained constant, and they are based on originally ratio variables.<sup>15</sup> Since the measures of education, political party affiliation, and personal political philosophy were categorical in nature with non-equal intervals, we used either cross-tabulation or analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to obtain Cramer's Vs or F values. Associations among the independent variables were not strong, so multicollinearity was unlikely to be a problem for future regression analysis. As expected, equality-based justice and desert-based justice are negatively correlated ( $r = -.53$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and their correlation with the attitudes toward increasing government funding for health care had opposite directions ( $r = .64$  and  $-.55$ , respectively). Knowledge about inequalities is positively correlated with equality-based justice and negatively correlated with desert-based justice, but the correlations are very weak ( $r = .16$  and  $-.17$ , respectively).

Since the dependent variables were measured with index scores that can be treated as continuous and independent variables were either continuous or dichotomous, we used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test three models – the dependent variables were equality-based justice, desert-based justice, and attitudes toward increasing government funding, respectively (Table 4). We created two dichotomous variables from the political party affiliation variable (Republican and Democrat) and three dichotomous variables based on the personal political philosophy (Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative). “Independent” and “other party” were not treated as a separate variable. The choice of the five categories/variables reflect our interest, but it was also made according to the Tukey results in one way ANOVA, which compare, in pair, all ordinal categories of the independent variable as to their relationship with the dependent variable (two justice norms in this case). The five categories above were significantly different from other categories. We also recoded education into a dichotomous variable (graduate or lower) because the original first category, lower than bachelor, had only 24 observations (5 percent).

All three models were statistically strong, with all F values significant at the .001 level. Adjusted R squares were either acceptable or desirable (.15, .34, and .62). All regression assumptions were met as shown by the VIF values and the residual analysis.

**Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations**

	Mean	Std.	Equa	Dess	Gender	white	Age	Sector	Income	Knowledge	Funding	Education	Party
Equa	2.94	0.66	(.90)										
Dess	2.17	0.61	-.53***	(.71)									
Gender	0.49	0.50	-.15***	.08 <sup>k</sup>									
White	0.75	0.43	-.03	-.04	.03								
Age	4.90	1.08	.08 <sup>k</sup>	-.12*	.15***	.17***							
Sector	0.66	0.47	-.09*	.10*	.12***	-.08 <sup>k</sup>	-.07 <sup>k</sup>						
Income	4.47	1.54	-.00	.00	.13***	.16***	.38*** *	-.14**					
Knowledge	0.72	0.32	.16***	-.17***	-.11**	-.03	.19*** *	-.06	.16***	(.66)			
Funding	2.85	0.61	.64***	-.55***	.00	-.05	.14*** *	-.08 <sup>k</sup>	.01	.12**	(.77)		
Education	n.a.	n.a.	0.73 <sup>a</sup>	2.91 <sup>a</sup>	.16** <sup>b</sup>	.05 <sup>b</sup>	.07 <sup>b</sup>	.03 <sup>b</sup>	.12 <sup>b</sup>	1.03 <sup>a</sup>	0.53 <sup>a</sup>		
Party	n.a.	n.a.	25.57*** <sup>a</sup>	69.46*** <sup>a</sup>	.17** <sup>b</sup>	.08 <sup>b</sup>	.12 <sup>ab</sup>	.13 <sup>ab</sup>	.15 <sup>ab</sup>	5.69*** <sup>a</sup>	32.08*** <sup>a</sup>	.10 <sup>b</sup>	
Philosophy	n.a.	n.a.	26.76*** <sup>a</sup>	85.64*** <sup>a</sup>	.12 <sup>ab</sup>	.19*** <sup>b</sup>	.11 <sup>b</sup>	.08 <sup>b</sup>	.10 <sup>b</sup>	6.16*** <sup>a</sup>	37.69*** <sup>a</sup>	.18** <sup>b</sup>	.41*** <sup>a</sup>

Note: <sup>a</sup> F values from ANOVA.  
<sup>b</sup> Cramer's V from Chi-Square tests.  
 Inside parentheses are Cronbach Alpha values.  
<sup>k</sup> p<.10; \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001

**Discussions**

Kohlberg (1976) asserts that “a person’s sense of justice is what is most distinctively and fundamentally moral...one cannot act morally and question the need for justice” (40). Unfortunately, empirical studies of perceived justice norms are rare in public administration literature. This article aims to extend the empirical justice literature in other disciplines to public administration and explore whether public administrators hold different justice norms, how they are associated with personal characteristics and knowledge, and how they affect individual attitudes toward government budgeting decisions. Our first hypothesis is confirmed and our results show that the concept of justice has two dimensions that are based on equality and desert respectively in the health care context.<sup>16</sup> Our analysis does not find that equality and need are two different principles of justice. This is not completely surprising because the close similarity between the two principles is acknowledged in the literature, which suggests that the greatest tension is between equality and desert (Miller 1992; Scott et al. 2001). Another explanation is that justice beliefs may be context-specific. It may be that the difference between the equality principle and the need principle is smaller in the health care area than in some other areas, given that the high proportion of population without health insurance (estimated 44 million) has become a significant policy issue. However, there is possibility that our survey items were unable to adequately capture all the justice dimensions, indicating that future research may need to create more items and re-test the dimensionality of justice. Regardless of the explanation, the existence of more than one justice dimensions is an important finding. It suggests that public administrators, like other people, may perceive competing justice norms and make trade offs when facing specific distribution situations.

The descriptive statistics further show that public administrators on average seem to have a higher level of the equality-based justice norm than the desert-based norm in the health care context.<sup>17</sup> This pattern is dissimilar to what previous surveys have found in ordinary people. Miller (1992) shows “popular opinion gives central place to desert in thinking about justice” (590). For example, one survey showed that 81 percent of those surveyed said that income should be based on skills and training, 13 percent of those surveyed said that income should be based on needs, and 6 percent of those surveyed called for some kind of compromise. One explanation is that public administrators are a unique group of people who are different from ordinary citizens, as the literature finds that public administrators are more humanitarian and trusting (Brewer 2003). Another explanation is that health care provision and government spending is a different context than income distribution, for which the economic logic plays a stronger role. Hochschild (1981) shows that Americans tend to apply distinctive norms in three separate domains: the socializing domain (e.g., families and schools), the political domain, and the economic domain. Health care public administrators may consider issues such as government spending as in the political domain. Future research may pay more attention to how policy domains affect the justice norms.

Moreover, our results support Hypothesis 3 regarding how justice norms affect individuals’ attitudes toward the idea of increasing government funding for health care. Indeed, equality-based justice is positively associated with the idea of increasing government funding, while desert-based justice is negatively associated with the idea. Therefore, it is important to discover, as Miller (1992) argues, “what these criteria amount to in practice, under what circumstances each is used, and what their relative strengths are when choices have to be made” (559). Such understandings are important for public administration because public administrators, especially at the street level, have discretion in interpreting and implementing public policies and administrative orders. We can create just public polices that are normatively appealing, but they will not advance a just society if public administrators employ different justice criteria. From this perspective, the important task for public administration scholars is not to prove or convince public officials that a specific justice principle (e.g., equality or Rawls’ difference principle) is always normatively preferable, but to examine how to “turn on” the specific justice norms in specific contexts. Appropriate framing, for example, may be an important issue in this regard.

Hypotheses 2 and 4 are supported as well. Individuals’ factual knowledge about health care inequalities is associated with neither of the two justice norms nor the attitudes toward increasing government funding. This raises important questions for public affairs education in regard to social justice. If students’ beliefs of justice are not influenced by their exposure to facts about health care inequalities, what are the effective ways to shape the beliefs that are rooted in deep personal values? If the mechanic presentation of facts cannot change student values, would presenting inequality stories in a more vivid, personal, and dramatic way have a better chance? On a more general level, few studies have been done to show that public affairs education is successful in shaping student values and norms given the constraints educators face.<sup>18</sup> Issues of debate in public administration, such as social justice, always involve different political ideologies, as we shall discuss below.

Our regression results show that being a Republican is less likely to be associated

**Table 4. Regression Results Explaining Attitudes toward Justice and Increasing Government Funding for Health Care**

	<b>EBJ</b>	<b>DBJ</b>	<b>AIGFHC</b>
Gender (1=male)	-.09	-.02	.06
Education (1=graduate)	-.08	-.04	.02
Republican (1=yes)	-.32***	.33***	.10*
Democrat (1=yes)	-.01	-.01	.13**
Liberal (1=yes)	.25*	-.27**	.21*
Moderate (1=yes)	.01	.02	.20*
Conservative (1=yes)	-.03	.17*	.00
Income	-.02	.10*	-.04
White (1=yes)	-.04	-.02	-.04
Age	.08*	-.10*	.08*
Sector (1=government)	-.02	.05	.02
Knowledge about health care inequality	.03	-.06	.00
Equality-Based Justice			.58***
Desert-Based Justice			-.19***
R <sup>2</sup>	.21	.39	.39
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	.15	.34	.34
F	3.95***	8.77***	8.77***

Note: 1. Reported are standardized estimates.

2. Both SPEC  $\chi^2$  and normality plots show the absence of heteroscedasticity.

3. Shapiro-Wilk test and normality plots show the presence of normality.

4. EBJ = Equality-Based Justice; DBJ = Desert-Based Justice;

AIGFHC = Attitudes toward Increasing Government Funding for Health Care.

5. \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001

with the equality principle and more likely to be associated with the desert principle. Liberals are more likely to be supportive of the equality norm, but not supportive of the desert norm. Being a conservative is positively associated with the desert principle, although it is not associated with the equality principle. The results suggest that to a large extent, individuals' beliefs of justice are rooted or embedded in their political ideologies. As Rawls (2001) writes, different conceptions of justice are the key to the present conflict between lib-

eral and conservative views over the legitimacy of social welfare policies. If we as educators and scholars call for a specific kind of justice principle, it may mean we call for a specific kind of political ideology. Such implications should be thought through in deciding how to teach social justice to our students and practitioners. Professors are free to speak, but they are also required, as they should, to respect each student's unique perspective and political orientation.

Interestingly, while various political party affiliations and political philosophies relate to the two justice norms in different ways, they are all positively associated with the idea of increasing government funding for health care, except that being a conservative is not associated with the idea. In other words, Republicans, Democrats, liberals and moderates in the sample are all supportive of the idea of increasing health care budget. It is possible that both Republicans and Democrats, both liberals and moderates, recognize the dismal situation with health care and demand more government action. However, Republicans and Democrats, as well as liberals and moderates, may have different opinions about the way in which the new budget for health care should be spent.

The fact that people's justice norms are affected more by ideologies than by factual knowledge raise some interesting issues for public administration researchers and educators. One issue is about the role of framing: how factual knowledge is framed may affect people's reaction. Gamliel and Peer (2006) find that people judge merit- and need-based principles as more just when allocation of a resource is presented in the positive framing manner (e.g., to deliver goods or withhold bads) than in the negative manner (e.g., to deliver bads or withhold goods). Because people have cognitive limitations, their decisions are less likely to be determined by what they might believe or know in principle; rather, they are more likely to be affected by what they actually focus on or make reference to when making a particular decision—framing shapes what people see as pertinent alternatives (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).

Another issue is that we may learn from Kohlberg's (1976) theory of moral development as to how to teach justice. Kohlberg (1976) is also concerned with the lack of consensus on what virtues are to be taught and the complexities of practicing such virtues. He argues that we should focus not on contents, but on structure – the process by which individuals approach moral dilemmas and the way people organize their understanding of virtues/rules/norms and integrate them into a moral choice. As Stewart, Sprinthall, and Siemienska (1997) contend, moral judgment is how a person thinks rather than what s/he thinks. We may want to teach students not what "the" principle of justice is, but how to reason in different situations involving judgments of justice. Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) point out that no single principle of justice and fairness represents moral maturity; rather, different principles are appropriate in different cultures and subcultures around the world.

Finally, after controlling for political party affiliations and political philosophies, personal characteristics only have limited effect on the two justice norms and the attitude toward increasing government funding for health care.<sup>19</sup> Gender, education level, race and sector (government or nongovernment) are not statistically significant in any of the models. Income level is significantly associated with only the desert principle: individuals with higher levels of income are more likely to support the desert-based norm. Income level has a neg-

ative association with the equality principle, but the association is not statistically significant. Finally, age is statistically significant in all of the three models. Older individuals are more likely to support the equality principle and the idea of increasing government funding for health care; they are less likely to embrace the desert principle. It is possible that older individuals are more anxious about their health care after retirement. It is also possible that older individuals become more tolerant and less competitive in their worldviews and lives.

## **Conclusion**

The increasing inequalities among American citizens have prompted the idea of practicing social justice in the public administration community. However, the public administration literature has largely been normative, advocating for a specific kind of justice principle such as Rawls' theory, and paying little attention to how the idea can be implemented. Toward this end, an important task is to examine how citizens and public administrators think about justice and how they make just decisions. As an initial effort, this article aims to take an empirical perspective and explore, in a limited way, public administrators' beliefs about justice. The results demonstrate that respondents to our survey hold at least two different justice principles – the equality principle and the desert principle, and on average the respondents have higher levels of equality-based beliefs. Those beliefs of justice are influenced by individuals' political ideologies, but not by their factual knowledge about inequalities. The two justice principles have different implications for increasing government funding. The findings underscore the critical role that people's views of justice have on their support and recommendations for public budget decisions.

This study, however, is only a preliminary effort based on a convenience sample. Our respondents are predominantly white, with a relatively high level of education and income. Association members may be different from non-members, New Jersey's political culture is different from many other states, and health care may be different from other policy domains. Therefore, caution must be taken in generalizing the results to other public administrators and other policy areas. In addition, although online surveys can ensure anonymity and reduce social desirability bias, it is difficult to know the true response rate and whether there was non-response bias (Simsek and Veiga 2001). Even though the sample size is not small and the findings are consistent with theories and other evidence in the literature, future research is very much necessary to validate the results here.

Another limitation is that some additional control variables were not included such as respondents' experience, level of employment, location in social networks, organizational culture, and policy areas. Future studies may examine whether public administrators' justice beliefs differ across regulatory, distributive, and redistributive policy areas, as well as how they are affected by organizational practices. Nonetheless, this limitation is not a serious problem to the extent that the major purpose of this study is not to fully explain justice beliefs, but to raise questions about the existence of multiple justice beliefs and its consequences.

Despite the limitations, this article offers the first empirical examination of individuals' justice beliefs in the public administration literature. The normative perspective is certainly important, necessary, and welcome, but theoretically-grounded empirical studies are

equally important in advancing human understandings and social practices. Certainly, empirical study of justice requires methodological rigor. As Miller (1992, 556) acknowledges, “empirical research may simply turn up a distorted set of ideas, biased by individual or class interest, cognitive failures of one kind or another, etc.” Nevertheless, survey research provides a direct and efficient way to assess individual beliefs, which is the purpose of this project. In Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s (1992) words, “we are looking for openings, or cracks, on some of the surfaces of ethical theorizing in which to insert an empirical wedge” (153). Public administration researchers should engage in broader perspectives of social justice and attend to the feasibility and legitimacy of implementing social justice concepts in practice.

This article raises important questions about the connection between the normative pursuit of justice and the empirical beliefs in practitioners’ minds. It also raises questions about public affairs education in regard to social justice and political ideologies: Is it possible or legitimate to teach a specific justice principle to the exclusion of others? Should the aim of justice education be to build up a pluralistic theory of justice with the multiple criteria held in consistent balance? Our results seem to suggest that the purpose of our teaching should not be to tell students what “the” justice principle is or give them more knowledge and facts; rather, it is to qualitatively change how students think about justice in various situations. Finally, as a preliminary exploration, this article is an invitation for future studies that bring together organizational theory, psychology, and political science to further examine the antecedents, correlates, consequences, and mechanisms of public administrators’ justice beliefs.

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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Conceptual difference certainly exists between equity and justice, and between distributive justice and procedural justice. We follow the social equity literature in public administration (e.g., Frederickson 1997, 1990, 1977) and focus on distributive justice in this article because the problem of distributive justice is arguably the most pressing concern in regard to social equity and social justice. We are aware that citizens and public administrators are also concerned with other dimensions of justice in government decision making such as procedural justice.

<sup>2</sup> Utilitarian theory, as espoused by Hume, Bentham, and later utilitarians, holds that principles of justice are rules that work for the greater good of all. Therefore, taking from the rich and giving to the poor is justified “not because the poor are entitled to some of what the rich have but because the poor will benefit more from this redistribution than the rich will suffer” (Singer 1975, 5).

<sup>3</sup> Maximin means to maximize the status of the least members.

<sup>4</sup> In teleological theories, the good is defined independently of the right, such that differing teleological theories (e.g., Aristotle’s versus Nietzsche’s) are at odds primarily in terms of how the good is specified. In contrast, Rawls’ theory is deontological, assuming the right is prior to the good. Dombrowski (2001) points out, “Rawls is committed to the idea that fairness requires that we reach agreement regarding principles of right, but not necessarily that we do so regarding a theory of good since each person is free to plan his or her life as he or she pleases as long as that person does so in ways that are consistent with justice” (39).

<sup>5</sup> Jones points out that the challenge to the neutralists is to either show that “basic structures of a liberal society can be set without making qualitative judgments that draw upon a theory of the good, or that, if such judgments are inescapable, they can nevertheless be sufficiently ‘thin’ for the liberal state to remain largely... neutral between rival conceptions of the good” (1989, 34).

<sup>6</sup> For other points of criticism, see Young (1990) and Harvey (1992). For example, Harvey (1992) takes a Marxist perspective, and argues that justice is the expression of the existing economic relations.

<sup>7</sup> Rawls’s original position is also criticized by communitarians from another angle (Etzioni 1996, 1993; Zelznick 1996). For example, Etzioni (1996, 12) argues that Rawlsian theories “seek to limit the social order to one that is derived from and legitimated by individuals acting as free agents.” The result, says Etzioni, is a “thin social order.” In contrast, Etzioni offers the view of communitarians who “see the need for a social order that contain a set of shared values.” However, as Woodiwiss (1999) argues, communitarianism has been “silent on the matter of economic justice and the conditions of the poor” (133).

<sup>8</sup> Internet surveys also have disadvantages: Response rate and representation of the sample are likely to be low; only people who have the Internet access can participate; participants’ technical skills may affect their responses; there are security and privacy concerns (Simsek and Veiga 2001).

<sup>9</sup> For example, the sample includes managerial personnel from the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Citizens, the New Jersey Department of Human Services, the State’s Budget Office, hospital administrators, and physicians with published email addresses in Union and Essex counties, New Jersey.

<sup>10</sup> This was done because we were interested only in public administrators.

<sup>11</sup> For example, Green’s (1991) rule of thumb for regression analysis is  $n > 50 + 8 * P$ , where P is the number of predictor variables. This article has 12 to 14 predictors (depending on model), which requires no more than 170 respondents. For factor analysis, Hatcher’s (1994) rule of thumb is 10 respondents for each indicator item. We have fewer than 20 indicators.

<sup>12</sup> The response rate of 27 percent is an estimate in the sense that we are not completely sure whether our targeted respondents invited others to participate. This is a common issue in online surveys. The response rate for online surveys depends on the nature of the study. A high response rate is very likely if one’s online survey targets a single organization with the support of the leaders of the organization (Simsek and Veiga 2001).

<sup>13</sup> The sample is somewhat skewed regarding income as a relatively high percentage of respondents earn over \$100,000. We conducted analysis with this group of respondents as a separate sub-sample, but the

pattern of the results is statistically the same as what reported here.

<sup>14</sup> We ran EFA with ML estimation, for which the results were similar to what we got from ULS estimation. We also tried to transform the 4-point Likert type scale into 5-point Likert type scale and re-ran EFA with ML estimation, the results were, again, similar.

<sup>15</sup> Please see Chun and Rainey (2005) and Moynihan and Pandey (2007) for similar treatment.

<sup>16</sup> If individuals held only one view, either the merit principle or the equality principle, then the correlation between the two variables should have been zero or very low. We found a correlation of -.53. We did not expect the correlation to be very high either because we assume they are distinctive dimensions.

<sup>17</sup> Among descriptive statistics, equality-based justice ( $M=2.94$ ,  $SD=0.66$ ) and desert-based justice ( $M=2.17$ ,  $SD=0.61$ ) can be compared directly because the two variables had similar scales and value ranges (1-4).

<sup>18</sup> This empirical statement is not to question the relevance of public affairs education, but to emphasize that such studies are lacking in the literature and we do not know the answer for sure.

<sup>19</sup> Hochschild (1981) reports that white Americans endorse less social, political, and economic equality than do African Americans. Our results do not reflect this probably because public administrators are different from ordinary citizens, but this deserves future research attention. In addition, future research may further examine whether managers in governments and nonprofits differ in their justice norms.

## Appendix 1. Major Survey Items Used in This Article

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### Intended for Need-Based Justice

No matter what it costs the tax payers, every citizen should be entitled to receive life-saving operations and related health care treatments as soon as needed.<sup>a</sup> (Need\_Based\_1)

Low-income senior citizens should have the same opportunities for appropriate access to prescription medicines as those seniors who have adequate incomes to afford their own prescriptions.<sup>a</sup> (Need\_Based\_2)

If a person with a painful knee condition is not treated properly due to lack of funds, that person is being treated unfairly.<sup>a</sup> (Need\_Based\_3)

No matter what the cost to tax payers, poor people should receive as high a level of quality health care for all their health problems as anyone else.<sup>a</sup> (Need\_Based\_4)

### Intended for Equality-Based Justice

No matter what it costs, justice will be served when every American citizen and legal resident has access to health care without financial or other barriers.<sup>a</sup> (Equality\_Based\_1)

Americans are denied equal opportunities when they do not receive expensive heart surgeries due to cost.<sup>a</sup> (Equality\_Based\_2)

No matter what the cost to taxpayers, guaranteed benefits for every American citizen and legal resident should meet the full range of health needs, including primary, preventive, and specialized care.<sup>a</sup> (Equality\_Based\_3)

Everyone – regardless of age, income, health status, or employment – should have access to the same type of health insurance coverage.<sup>a</sup> (Equality\_Based\_4)

### Intended for Desert-Based Justice

Justice prevails when people receive by way of reward an equivalent to the contributions they make.<sup>a</sup> (Desert\_Based\_1)

Incomes should not be more equal since the rich invest in the economy, creating jobs and benefits for everyone.<sup>a</sup> (Desert\_Based\_2)

People are entitled to benefit totally and exclusively from the exercise of their talents and abilities. If they have high incomes, the government should not tax their income or wealth with rates that are significantly higher than average tax rates.<sup>a</sup> (Desert\_Based\_3)

If incomes were more equal, nothing would motivate people to work hard.<sup>a</sup> (Desert\_Based\_4)

### Knowledge about Health Care Inequality

Research shows that black and African-American women are less likely than white women to have access to mammograms for early breast cancer detection. Are you aware of this finding?<sup>c</sup>

Research shows that black and African-American infants have a much greater infant mortality rate than white infants. Are you aware of this finding?<sup>c</sup>

Research shows that blacks and African-Americans are less likely than whites to be given heart bypass surgery, when needed. Are you aware of this finding?<sup>c</sup>

### Attitudes toward Increasing Government Funding for Health Care (AIGFHC)

Public funds for patients should be increased by states to assist hospitals in treating the poor through charity care or a similar program.<sup>a</sup>

Large increases in public funds should be budgeted by the federal government to provide health insurance for people who currently do not have health insurance.<sup>a</sup>

Additional public funds should be budgeted by my state to increase and expand Medicaid insurance benefits for the poor and uninsured.<sup>a</sup>

**Gender:** 1=male; 0=female

**Race:** 1=white; 0=non-white

**Sector:** 1=government; 0=nonprofit or quasi government

**Education:** 1= lower than bachelor; 2=bachelor; 3=graduate

**Age:** 1= less than 18; 2=18-24; 3=25-34; 4=35-44; 5=45-54; 6=55-64; 7=65 and over

**Income:** 1=less than \$25000; 2=\$25000-\$49999; 3=\$50000-\$74999; 4=\$75000-\$99999; 5=\$100000-\$149999; 6=\$150000-\$199999; 7=\$200000-\$249999; 8=\$250000 and up

**Political Party:** 1=republi can; 2=democrat; 3=other party; 4=independent; 5=not sure

**Political philosophy:** 1=liberal; 2=moderate; 3=conservative; 4=not sure

**Notes:**

<sup>a</sup> Items were measured on a 4-point agree/disagree scale (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree).

<sup>b</sup> Items were measured on a 4-point scale: Complete equality, more equality, about the same, less equality (reverse coding).

<sup>c</sup> Items were measured on a dichotomous scale: 1=yes, 0=no.